One way to read this is “phew, whatever I’m working on is nowhere near this bad, so I can sleep soundly.”
But I also think there’s another way to see it: as a cautionary tale. If you don’t care, if you don’t teach, if you don’t create the right processes and culture and incentives, if you don’t prevent certain doors from being opened, if you don’t push and empower others to push against the entropy and the laziness – this might be how your stuff ends up, too.
Marques Brownlee published a video commenting on YouTube’s just-announced A:B testing feature. In short, for some creators, it will be possible to publish slightly different versions of the video at launch time to different parts of their audience, if those versions are deemed “close enough” to the original.
Brownlee digs into how confusing this feature might be in actual use for viewers, never sure whether they’re watching, commenting, or rewatching the same video as others see, or even as themselves earlier saw. Toward the end of the video, Brownlee shifts his focus toward other YouTubers, with a monologue that I wanted to quote here because it captures something important:
You know, this is being framed as a tool to help you improve your videos. But I think for 99.9% of creators – well, to be literal, it’s not actually helping you make better videos; it’s helping you find which version of your video has the best retention, which doesn’t necessarily mean it’s a better video – hot take.
And there are so many examples of creative decisions that I have made, and that so many others have made in the video creation process, that are definitely not the best retention-optimized decisions, but they’re fun, and creative, and interesting, and new, and entertaining, and characterful.
So there’s always going to be the top 0.1% of channels that are all about mass appeal, and that’s fine. But last time I checked, a lot of what makes YouTube fun is the stuff that is more niche down, that is not mass appeal by definition. It’s the cool small hobby you found, or it’s the fun, unique thing that you just discover that only a few people are talking about that – that stuff! That’s what makes it fun.
I think if a lot of those channels and videos suddenly became like superoptimized, retention-maxing, and everything, those would get a lot less fun to watch. And so imagine if all the feedback anyone ever listened to was just to have the best retention – as you optimize over and over and over again, you start to trim out all of the other creative stuff that happens to not be the most efficient way to tell a story.
So I guess what I’m trying to say is... the skill of being a video creator on YouTube is not always necessarily about the maxed out, most efficient, optimized way to do everything, but it’s to find creative ways to share something, or teach something, or explore or explain something, or review something. So I just think making and finishing and publishing a bunch of videos is a better use of a creator’s time than making one thing and then, you know, a whole bunch of different drafts of titles, and thumbnails, and different cuts of the video to try to optimize for, like, the last few percent. […]
That’s all. I think just stand by your creative choices. You made this video, this is the video you chose to make. And now you get to share it, and you put it out, and you learn from it. […] That’s the creative process. Have conviction in what you want to share with the world.
There is another half-pulled-on thread in his video: Brownlee doesn’t say it directly, but dances around the idea that the very fact this feature was launched is reflecting on YouTube’s own insecurity as a product. Jim Nielsen follows up on that on his blog:
I find it interesting how Brownlee shares his opinion that YouTube spends way too much time chasing their competitors and not enough time being YouTube.
Which, when you think about it, is exactly the kind of place a feature like this would stem from: an insecurity in your own creative choices. How YouTube approaches its own insecurities is now trickling down as a feature to its users.
“Let’s let people make lots of variations on things, try all of them, and see what performs best” is exactly the kind of thinking you get in a platform that doesn’t know what it wants to be. So it’s left spending its time 1) doing what others are doing, and 2) following the fickle whims of whatever it can measure.
Brownlee talks a lot about YouTube videos being “fun, and creative, and interesting, and new, and entertaining, and characterful.” Those might not be the most important adjectives to apply to all of software, of course, but there are some interesting throughlines here. I have also personally not seen a lot of thoughtful A:B testing in my career. I think those are an easy way to lose yourself, to have your app become a bundle of metrics that everyone obeys, but no one understands, and – once you open the door to being driven by poorly-understood experiments – for the desire to fall back on patterns from other successful apps, without reflection, to grow stronger and stronger.
That’s how you end up with stuff Nielsen and perhaps even Brownlee argue YouTube itself has become: a set of Brownian reactions, or a warmed-over software cosmic latte, if you will. From my perspective, this often also leads to systems of interactions or features that don’t come together well to the user, as you end up borrowing from other places without the necessary hard work of translating them to feel at home and consistent with your system and its quirks and conventions. From what I’ve seen in my career, A:B tests do not promote design execution rigor. The tests are meant to be light by definition, since a lot of them are expected to fail. Before the test, there is limited incentive to invest in quality, but neither there is one after the test – if A or B successfully raises a metric, you don’t want to mess with it then, since what if you change the very thing that made it “work”?
On top of all that, we can add what Brownlee started with in his video: overeager A:B tests feel like software’s version of gaslighting. How can you trust an app if it feels like it’s changing without rhyme and reason seemingly on a weekly basis, whose changes are not announced or documented anywhere (small A:B tests never are), and when other people don’t see the things you see?
The Max variant of the 737 was redesigned to allow larger, more efficient engines, but this made it less predictable, which the company decided to paper over in software:
The airframe, the hardware, should get it right the first time and not need a lot of added bells and whistles to fly predictably. This has been an aviation canon from the day the Wright brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk.
Apparently the 737 Max pitched up a bit too much for comfort on power application as well as at already-high angles of attack. It violated that most ancient of aviation canons and probably violated the certification criteria of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. But instead of going back to the drawing board and getting the airframe hardware right (more on that below), Boeing relied on something called the “Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System,” or MCAS.
Boeing’s solution to its hardware problem was software.
This feels like an interesting extension to the fly-by-wire story of Air France Flight 447, where Boeing seemed to be on the other side of the fence to the Airbus. Perhaps no more:
[…] It seems that with the 737 Max, Boeing has changed philosophies about human/machine interaction as quietly as they’ve changed their aircraft operating manuals.
Travis argues that people building the software did not fully understand the shift, and particularly didn’t really understand how pilots fly the airplane during more challenging moments:
Those lines of code were no doubt created by people at the direction of managers. Neither such coders nor their managers are as in touch with the particular culture and mores of the aviation world as much as the people who are down on the factory floor, riveting wings on, designing control yokes, and fitting landing gears. Those people have decades of institutional memory about what has worked in the past and what has not worked. Software people do not.
The real reason? Money.
MCAS is certainly much less expensive than extensively modifying the airframe to accommodate the larger engines. […] What’s worse, those changes could be extensive enough to require not only that the FAA recertify the 737 but that Boeing build an entirely new aircraft. Now we’re talking real money, both for the manufacturer as well as the manufacturer’s customers.
That’s because the major selling point of the 737 Max is that it is just a 737, and any pilot who has flown other 737s can fly a 737 Max without expensive training, without recertification, without another type of rating. Airlines—Southwest is a prominent example—tend to go for one “standard” airplane. They want to have one airplane that all their pilots can fly because that makes both pilots and airplanes fungible, maximizing flexibility and minimizing costs.
It all comes down to money, and in this case, MCAS was the way for both Boeing and its customers to keep the money flowing in the right direction. The necessity to insist that the 737 Max was no different in flying characteristics, no different in systems, from any other 737 was the key to the 737 Max’s fleet fungibility. That’s probably also the reason why the documentation about the MCAS system was kept on the down-low.
Put in a change with too much visibility, particularly a change to the aircraft’s operating handbook or to pilot training, and someone—probably a pilot—would have piped up and said, “Hey. This doesn’t look like a 737 anymore.” And then the money would flow the wrong way.
There are some harsh words toward the entire software industry toward the end. This feels directionally accurate to me, and resonated even before the arrival of generative AI:
I believe the relative ease—not to mention the lack of tangible cost—of software updates has created a cultural laziness within the software engineering community. Moreover, because more and more of the hardware that we create is monitored and controlled by software, that cultural laziness is now creeping into hardware engineering—like building airliners. Less thought is now given to getting a design correct and simple up front because it’s so easy to fix what you didn’t get right later.
Blog entries are linked throughout, complete with cover images – it’s a nice way to distinguish small changes from big improvements.
The fixes are attributed to specific people. (This part doesn’t appear on mobile.) Particularly nice to see support for more than one person collaborating on a fix – I’ve had fun memories working at various companies of pairing up with someone else to debug a particularly tricky problem.
It’s a human story whose beats might be familiar to some of you: a long software project that ultimately failed despite the enormous effort. And it did so in an industry – high-budget videogames – where failures might feel particularly brutal: the projects take multiple years but the defeat can be swift, the servers get shut down and the game instantly evaporates, and instead of employees being reallocated to other games, the studio gets disbanded and people let go.
There are some nice moments in the podcast’s interviews with about a dozen people, hearing about personal pride and responsibility, working together with others, and a certain camaraderie not just with other people, but with their software that develops:
I think the best part about it was being able to play with my coworkers and then cutting loose, and being silly, and really enjoying what we made together, as a unit. That experience alone made it worth it.
There are also questions about the management’s role in all of this – this part we might never get to know fully – and the worry about game preservation.
This is not mentioned in the podcast, but it seems widely understood the story is about Concord, a AAA live-service game that is rumored to have cost a staggering $400 million dollars and taken 8 years to develop, only to be shut down mere 12 days after its launch in the late 2024. (AAA means a blockbuster with highest budgets seen by the industry, and live service means a game like Fortnite, which is expected to make money over time from add-ons and upgrades.)
Learning about Concord’s macro view adds a lot of color to the boots-on-the-ground podcast above, but one has to be careful exploring it; the online discourse about the game felt similar to the 2016 reboot of the movie Ghostbusters where sure, the product might have been subpar, but also a lot of commenters seemed eager to arrive to the conversation carrying truckloads of bad faith, gatekeeping, and misogyny.
Some good articles? Keza MacDonald in the Guardian has a nice summary of the whole situation:
This is a brutal sequence of events. Sony bought the makers of Concord, Firewalk Studios, in 2023. Concord had been in development for eight years, and it was an expensive game, with bespoke cinematics and a long-term plan that would have cost $100m or more to develop. In its two weeks on the market, it sold fewer than 25,000 copies, according to estimates. This is a shocker, even compared with the year’s other bad news for developers and studios.
MacDonald also adds:
Speaking personally, I do not want a game that takes years to play. I want one with something to say, an experience to impart, and one that eventually ends. A game whose artistry comes before its business model.
This is partly a matter of taste. Self-evidently, there is an enormous market for live-service multiplayer games; it’s just that most of those people are already playing one. I highly doubt that there are untapped millions of players desperate for a hero shooter or battle royale game who just haven’t found the right one yet. It’s time that publishers try something new instead.
With so many games now taking close to a decade from the beginning of development to release, we’re starting to see the financial and creative consequences of an overlong development cycle. Spend too much time in development and ideas that were once novel are no longer in vogue. Furthermore, the time and money spent over those years has to be recouped somehow, which leads to decisions like the $40 cost of entry for Concord when many of its peers are free to play.
The cost of coming late to the party means you must bring something new to the table. Unfortunately, Concord is neither particularly innovative nor content-heavy. That said, it does have a level of polish at launch that was often absent from its hero shooter peers when they were first released. Indeed, Concord’s weekly animation story drops are fully motion-capture, and Firewalk’s time spent on crafting its lore has helped secure Concord an episode of this winter’s video game animation anthology series, Secret Level.
But well-established hero shooters like EA’s Apex Legends launched almost bare bones and still managed to make a splash thanks to its intriguing central concept which combined hero loadouts with a battle royale match format. Valve’s Deadlock doesn’t even have finalized assets or art but has still caused a huge burst of excitement among the PC community, thanks to the way it changes up the classic 6v6 hero formula with its heavy lane-and-minions MOBA [Multiplayer Online Battle Arena—ed.] mechanics. By contrast Concord appeared with an all-too-familiar offering and, frankly, the time spent on finessing its presentation – the graphics, motion capture, performance, and so on – likely lead to a later release date which in turn meant it lost valuable time establishing itself among its peers. If it had been released four or five years ago, when the PS5 first came out, maybe its launch would have been an entirely different story.
I think this is important to quote on this blog that often talks about “finessing” and implicitly – or sometimes explicitly – about the value of taking time to get the details right. We can’t forget that there are such things as overdesigning and overproducing, and that ultimately there is no way to polish your way out of something that lacks a soul.
I still use Sublime Text for all of my programming and all of my newsletter-ing. […] The app is simple and superfast; I have it set up exactly the way I like it […], and it’s difficult for me to imagine ever switching to anything else.
Here is a piece of software as sturdy and obedient as a cast-iron pan.
I don’t know who develops it and I don’t care. All I know is that I can place my text cursor and read the surrounding code without a bombardment of popovers, pop-unders, pop-left-and-rights, pop-inlines, pop-in-and-out-too-fast-to-sees. […]
The perfect dev stack is a collection of software that each does one job and doesn’t suffer main character syndrome. I want to code, I’m not looking to make lifestyle choices. I don’t want a bloated everything app. Don’t get me started on the “unified toolchain” plague! Show me the latest VC-backed build tool and I’ll show you ten lines of PHP that does a better job.
If you’re fed up of the absolute state of things, Sublime Text still works.
I do care who develops good software since, at the very least, I want to give them credit. This is the best I could find, if you too are curious. It was prompted by someone asking:
I’ve been a Sublime Text user for over a decade, and now a Sublime Merge user, too. But it occurs to me that I know almost nothing about the team/company behind it.
I wonder if this is a nice example of the (quiet) posture of the company matching the (utilitarian) personality of the software it is making.
★★★★☆ (as a book)
★★★☆☆ (for the purposes of this blog)
There are as many books about Steve Jobs as there were Quadra models, but they focus mostly on two phases:
1955–1985 – Steve Jobs befriending Wozniak, the early days of Apple, Lisa, and the Mac
1997–2011 – Steve Jobs’s “second act” at Apple, and the creation of the iMac, iPod, iPhone, and so on
Steve Jobs in Exile by Geoffrey Cain is a just-released, rare volume that focuses on the “in-between years” – starting with Steve Jobs founding NeXT and Pixar after his Apple ouster, and ending with him coming back to Apple under the absolutely strangest of circumstances. It’s a doubly interesting phase, both because we see Jobs maturing as a leader and actually learning from his many mistakes, and because the early technical NeXT decisions eventually became underpinnings for modern macOS and iOS.
I do not see this as a book of new immense insight, technical depth, or design details, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t go beyond surface level. What I appreciated most was Cain not shying away from pointing at some of Steve Jobs’s mistakes: hiring wrong people he happened to like, almost driving the company to the ground through obstinance, inability to focus on things he considered uninteresting, and a profound dose of duplicity coming into the NeXT/Apple merger.
Other things that stood out: focus on people around Jobs, spotlight on Jobs’s disappointing moral flexibility around working with government (or befriending Larry Ellison, for that matter), and a really fun pizza ordering story that serves as a prelude to the Starbucks call during the iPhone 2007 keynote.
Some learnings:
Craft and taste alone are not enough; you can spend your talents and energy on things that don’t “matter” given some definition of the word. That could be okay if that’s a choice you make – “impact” is ill-defined and often overrated, anyway – but you need to approach it clear-eyed, which Jobs didn’t initially know how to do.
Confidence, like everything, needs to be practiced, and focused, and influenced back by feedback and reactions. (Witness the negotiating acumen of a certain Jean-Louis Gassée!)
It’s really hard to create a culture of hard and honest and deep conversations that’s also not a culture of abuse and toxicity.
The one thing I didn’t like about the book was that the few photos inside are only perfunctory; there’s a lot of chatter about a beautiful, symbolic NeXT lobby staircase, top-of-the-landline phones, and expensive chairs, but we never get to see them. Many of the photos are by Doug Menuez – which you can also see online – but the problem is that those photos are generally not that interesting.
That aside, it’s still a breezy and entertaining read that filled in some gaps and provoked new thoughts.
I want to show you something glorious. This is Bear, the note taking app:
There are desktop apps that get flustered if you ⌘+Tab away and back, misplacing focus or closing a dialog box inside. There are iOS apps that fully reset themselves whenever they get swapped out of memory and have to be reloaded.
But Bear, right here, remembers which note you were on, and exactly where you were in that note, even between phone reboots.
Software is transient and malleable, and one of the hard parts is knowing when that’s beneficial and when detrimental. In real life, you can leave a notebook on your desk, open on a certain page, leave a pen pointing to a specific word – and then depart for a two-month trip to Europe. You will find your notebook exactly how you left it. Why shouldn’t software behave this way?
Also, another thought: This is very likely not something users will complain about when broken, or suggest when absent, even if you go out of your way to open yourself for feedback. Just swapping an app out of memory is hard to understand and “repro” (in engineering parlance). There’s a certain design mindset and taste necessary to notice and care, and a certain vision to carry it through.
The lack of direct user feedback doesn’t mean it’s not worth doing. It just means that there are some things that designers and only designers will know how to properly weigh, describe, and prioritize. If you have a few design-minded users that actually send you feedback like this – treasure them. But most likely this will have to come from “inside the house.”
To me, it’s clear that within Shiny Frog (the makers of Bear), there are people who care about this kind of stuff, and leadership that trusts them. Kudos.
The UI for filing bugs is inscrutable and has too many hoops to jump through.
No one does anything unless every field has been filed meticulously and there is a clear repro.
The designer is ridiculed if the thing isn’t actually a bug, is a duplicate, or if it was filed in the wrong place.
Front-end bugs are automatically “minor” or “nice to have”s without listening (as there is no loss of functionality, and no data loss).
The designer is always responsible for stating how it should work, without being able to say “I am not sure why, but this started feeling off and it’s in an important place. Can we investigate?”
“This is as designed” is an automatic conversation ender.
The tiniest of external reports, social posts, or blog posts, immediately are prioritized higher than in-house experience.
Once every few years, a designer gets 20+ demotivating automated emails saying 20+ bugs they filed over the years have been closed automatically during a purge, without any word of explanation.
Simple human touches like “thanks for filing!” or “nice catch!” never enter the picture.
Engineers never file design bugs themselves.
If you’re an engineer, I can sense you might be getting frustrated, as most bullet points I listed look like extra work. I agree with you. It is. This post is as much about process, as it is about culture and the incentives it establishes. The best places I’ve worked were filled with shared trust and treated bugs as a joined responsibility of everyone, rather than a black-and-white division into “filers“ and “fixers,” with the ultimate end goal always being user’s experience – nothing else.
I also understand this dives right into an age-old tension between manufacture and craft. Bug-fixing processes have to be well-oiled bureaucracies with very specific rules so that they don’t turn into a pile of vibes and Brownian motions. But design (and, by extension, a lot of front-end) doesn’t work like that. Design needs room for taste, for careful exceptions, for escalation of immesurable things, and for a certain flexibility in even the basic definitions.
If it’s a tiny, but embarrassing bug, or a flow killer, or a thing that bothers your most valuable group of users, or something appearing in a well-trafficked place – it is no longer tiny. If it’s working as intended, but it feels buggy to the user – it ought to be a bug. If it’s a long-standing bug, it should be considered as cumulative damage already done, not “oh, this has been like this for a long time, no one cares.” If there’s a shaky repro, but the bug feels important, you need to work from principles or analyze the code. If it’s something no one mentioned externally (ergo: why fix it?), consider a lot of bugs rankle but never get reported, particularly if your company doesn’t project an external presence of caring about feedback and acting upon it. cough cough Apple cough cough cough cough cough dies coughing
Of course, designers have responsibilities in the process also, among them mutual respect and understanding of engineering, clarity of communication (particularly about things that are hard to reason about mathematically), seeing patterns that could be grouped into bigger bug bundles to make fixing more efficient, (occasionally!) helping figure out a fix if the obvious fix isn’t available, and shared understanding with their team about what actually matters. There is always a thousand details that could be better, but for every thousand only a hundred might actually be worthwhile. Flooding the bug process with irrelevant minutiae that won’t realistically ever be fixed is not very helpful.
This is the only way I know of to capture the full spectrum of bugs that ruin software – from front-end to back-end, from visual/interactive quality to works-or-not functionality, from what can be measured to what never will be. And this is not just about designers, of course. It’s not even about any non-engineering function. Design serves everyone; if your bug-filing UI or your process or your definitions are not well-designed or -balanced, I strongly believe you’re also hurting engineers on your team. And you’re definitely hurting your users.
When the project succeeded, her work had dissolved into the project’s infrastructure. The doc was just “the doc.” The tracker was just “the tracker.” The alignment was just how things were. People forgot it had ever been otherwise. That’s the thing about good coordination. I’ve realized that when it works, it disappears. You can’t see it precisely because it worked.
Even though Pandya didn’t call that out, it’s worth highlighting that his “founder friend” example wasn’t a woman by pure chance; often the invisible work becomes the second shift of women in the workplace. And then:
The problem is that recognition follows narrative. When a project succeeds, credit flows to the people whose contributions are easy to describe. The person who presented to the board. The person whose name is on the launch email. The person who shipped the final feature. These contributions are real, I’m not diminishing them. But they’re not more real than the work that made them possible. They’re just easier to point at. Easier to put in a slide. And I think that’s where the unfairness starts, slowly, without people really noticing.
However, I disagreed with these parts:
There’s no framework that fixes this. You can’t design a rubric that captures “held the project together.”
Wait, why not? This is a similar challenge to quantifying design contributions (some of which might not clearly map to KPIs or sometimes even OKRs). You can’t measure being in the flow, true user satisfaction and frustration, or world-class-adjacency of taste. But it doesn’t mean you cannot design a system or a rubric that recognizes and talks about them.
If you’ve ever read about “choice architecture” and nudging, this will feel familiar. The modern language for it was popularized in the late 2000s, and the core idea is simple: how choices are presented changes what people do, even if nothing is technically forced.
Then product teams go one step further. Instead of just shaping choices, you can shape timing. Prompts start showing up in the middle of workflows because that’s when the user is “most engaged.”
The industry also has a whole discipline around persuasive design and how to move someone from intention to action with prompts, friction removal, and well-timed triggers. B.J. Fogg’s behavior model is one of the more cited frameworks in this space.
Some nudges are genuinely helpful. But the same machinery that helps you discover a feature can also be used to push you into something you didn’t come here to do. And once the machinery exists, it gets reused.
I am finding myself wanting to quote most of it.
You cannot easily measure the resentment. Or the rage clicks when they smash a button to dismiss another “did you know” pop-up. You cannot easily chart the moment a user thinks, “I used to like this product, and now it feels needy.” You cannot easily quantify the slow erosion of trust.
I have long been frustrated by how the “growth” interfaces haven’t really evolved past cheap and loud pop-ups and defaulting to “let’s just show it.” One of the behaviours that bother me a lot that’s not listed in the post is, for example, installing an app and receiving one or even more “here’s what’s new” onboarding callouts. Hey. I just installed you. Everything is new.
Anyway, maybe one more quote:
Optimize for trust, not just return visits. Short-term engagement can be increased by annoyance. Long-term loyalty is harder and more valuable. The best products I use don’t constantly remind me to use them. They quietly do their job so well that I come back when I need them. That’s what tools are supposed to do.
From the vantage point of 2025, optimization is clearly no longer a priority for the tech platforms. Google’s search results have gotten worse. Google doesn’t care. Facebook is awash in AI slop. It welcomes the slop. Amazon is filled with fake products and fake reviews. All of these companies still dominate their categories. Degrading the user experience isn’t costing them. The motivating belief that these companies hadto optimize, or else they would be out-competed, no longer drives Silicon Valley behavior. Optimization was an era. That era has ended.
Most of us got into tech with an earnest desire to leave the world better than we found it. But the incentives and cultural norms of the tech industry have coalesced around the logic of hyper-scale. It’s become monolithic, magnetic, all-encompassing—an environment that shapes all who step foot there. While the business results are undeniable, so too are the downstream effects on humanity.
It reinforces my belief that teams need a culture that values attention to detail when building products. Tiny annoyances so often get neglected as we rush to ship, but the consequences accumulate, souring the whole brand. It’s not a long journey from “Ugh, these AirTags…” to “Apple has lost their way…”
But in my experience, those rough edges seldom go unnoticed by someone, somewhere, who was unable to stop the momentum of a product release for such an “insignificant” flaw. Or, even more consequentially, they did not feel it was safe to do so.
I want to quote so much of this essay, so I’m going to do just that.
I’ve always felt that culture is made of the accumulation of small acts of gracious leadership: acknowledging moments of bravery during a retro, teasing out a reticent comment during a product review, and on and on. It can come from other places too, but it is most effective when it comes from the top.
If you’re leading a team remember: Never criminalize pride in craft.